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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0), (4). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on a 
compromise sum that was the basis for the settlement of a claim—the existence and 
amount of which was disputed and remained unliquidated through two days of trial? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment 
interest presents a question of law which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, f 16, 82 P.3d 1064. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved through Appellants' pretrial 
memorandum and post trial motion. (R 285-301; 378-86.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations that 
are determinative on this issue.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This lawsuit arose from a dispute concerning whether additional payment was 
owed for construction performed by Plaintiff/Appellee Iron Head Construction, Inc. 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, the statute which allows for, and sets forth the 
allowable amount of, awards of prejudgment interest on liquidated sums does not apply 
herein for the reasons set forth below. 
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("Iron Head") on the residence of the Defendants/Appellants (the "Gurneys"). Iron Head 
sought to recover payments above and beyond the parties' agreed-upon contract price 
under both contract and equitable implied-contract theories. However, the amount Iron 
Head claimed it was owed was inconsistent, nebulous, and unsubstantiated—both before 
and during trial—varying between $60,000 and in excess of $100,000. On the third day 
of trial, the parties elected to settle all of Iron Head's claims for the compromised sum of 
$43,500. The parties were not able to agree on Iron Head's entitlement to prejudgment 
interest, however, and the parties briefed the issue for decision by the trial court. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the settlement was not a judgment but rather a compromise 
amount, negotiated by the parties, the trial court awarded Iron Head prejudgment interest 
on the compromised sum, calculated from December 31, 2000—a date prior to the filing 
of Iron Head's Complaint. The Gurneys appeal from the award of prejudgment interest. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Iron Head filed suit on January 5, 2001 to collect payment above and beyond the 
parties' contract price for work done on the Gurneys' residence. Iron Head's Complaint 
alleged four causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) quantum meruit, (3) unjust 
enrichment; and (4) foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. The Gurneys answered, disputing 
each of Iron Head's claims and many of the allegations in Iron Head's Complaint. Trial 
followed. 
Following three days of trial, on November 13, 2003 the parties agreed to settle all 
of Iron Head's claims for the compromised sum of $43,500—after it became apparent 
that the trial could not be completed within the allotted time and would need to be 
recommenced months later. At the time of settlement, Iron Head was still presenting its 
case in chief; the Gurneys had not yet presented their case. As agreed, the Gurneys paid 
the settlement amount in full. The Gurneys did not agree, however, that Iron Head was 
entitled to prejudgment interest on the compromised amount. Iron Head requested an 
award of such interest and the parties briefed the issue for decision by the trial court as a 
matter of law. 
On December 13, 2003, following briefing, but without oral argument, the trial 
court awarded Iron Head prejudgment interest at a rate of 10% per annum on the 
compromise sum of $43,500, calculated from December 31, 2000 until the date of 
settlement on November 13, 2003, a total amount of $12,835.48. 
This Order was later reduced to final judgment, filed much later on August 11, 
2006. This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. In early 2000, the Gurneys hired Iron Head to perform certain construction 
and remodel work on the on the Gumeys' residence pursuant to a contract which called 
for payment of a fixed amount of $168,558.00.2 (R. 285, 298; 335.) 
2
 The trial in this case was cut short by the parties' settlement. At the time of 
settlement, Iron Head was still in the middle of presenting its case in chief, and only its 
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2. The contract was negotiated by Richard Curtis, on behalf of Iron Head, and 
Alan and Vicki Gurney. (R. 335.) 
3. Construction began in February 2000. (R. 335.) 
4. After construction began, Iron Head presented only three invoices to the 
Gurneys. In fact, the Gurneys made a substantial payment of $43,028.00 about one 
month before receiving Iron Head's first formal invoice, dated April 26, 2000, for the 
amount of $49,871. One week later, the Gurneys made their next payment to Iron Head 
in the amount of $51,476. (R. 351.) 
5. Likewise, the second invoice, dated June 28, 2000, in the amount 
$49,951.58, was paid about a week after presentation. (R. 351.) 
6. It was not until Iron Head presented its last invoice to the Gurneys in 
August 2000 ("August Invoice"), after Iron Head essentially stopped, that questions arose 
about payment. (R. 350-51; 385.) 
7. The August Invoice requested payment of $92,261.62. The August Invoice 
failed to credit the Gurneys with all of the $136,455 they had already paid to Iron Head 
and, for the first time, asked for payment of an amount in excess of that established by 
(cont.) principal (Richard Curtis) and banker had testified. As such, the trial evidence is 
incomplete and of limited value (particularly to the issue on appeal). However, in 
connection with their Post Judgment Memorandum Re: Attorney Fees, the Gurneys 
offered an affidavit of their expert, Patrick J. Kilbourne, CPA, CMA, on the limited 
matters relevant to Iron Head's request for prejudgment interest. This affidavit was not 
objected to by Iron Head or otherwise stricken by the trial court and is, therefore, part of 
the record on appeal, appearing at R. 337-52. Many of the facts cited herein come from 
this affidavit. 
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the parties' written contracts. No change orders had been prepared as required by the 
contract. And while the possibility of extra costs had been discussed (according to 
Mr. Curtis), he admitted that he had provided no estimates or invoices estimating or 
confirming the amount of such costs. (R. 334, 351, 385.) 
8. The Gurneys promptly paid $25,000 toward the August Invoice, even 
though it was practically incomprehensible. For example, while this invoice correctly 
acknowledged the original contract amount, it set forth line items that were inconsistent 
with the information on the prior invoices. The August Invoice was also markedly at 
odds with the invoices from and payments to Iron Head's suppliers and subcontractors 
produced by Iron Head in discovery. (R. 349-50; 385.) 
9. Importantly, the August Invoice was the last invoice received by the 
Gurneys before this action was filed. They received no subsequent statements and no 
follow-up or corrected invoices. The work that was the subject of the contract was never 
completed by Iron Head. There was, in fact, very little contact between Iron Head and 
the Gurneys until early December 2000, when Richard Curtis dropped by the Gurneys' 
house. (R. 350-51; 385-86.) 
10. At the December 2000 meeting, Richard Curtis met with Alan Gurney to 
discuss additional amounts Mr. Curtis claimed were owed for construction. Mr. Curtis 
brought an invoice with him to this meeting. This invoice, dated November 22, 2000, 
which claimed an additional amount owed of $82,463.33, does not reconcile with the 
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previous invoices provided by Iron Head. Following the parties' discussion, in which 
voices were not raised according to Mr. Curtis, Mr. Curtis left without even showing the 
invoice to Mr. Gurney. The invoice was never mailed or otherwise actually presented to 
the Gurneys except through discovery in this lawsuit. Iron Head also did not attempt to 
support the invoiced amount as the amount due at trial. (R. 298; 33-334; 350-51; 384.) 
11. After the December 2000 meeting, Iron Head instructed its attorney to file a 
Notice of Lien against the Gurneys5 residence in the amount of $119,051.07 plus interest, 
costs, and attorney fees. Notably, the lien amount once again differed from any of the 
previous amounts Iron Head claimed were owed for the construction. Iron Head never 
attempted to substantiate or support the lien amount at trial. (R. 2-3; 333; 350; 384.) 
12. Iron Head filed suit against the Gurneys on January 5, 2001, alleging four 
different causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) quantum meruit, (3) unjust 
enrichment; and (4) foreclose of the mechanics lien. For the first three claims, Iron Head 
sought approximately $71,000 plus profit and interest, while on the fourth claim it sought 
$119,051 plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. Although these claims were nominally 
different, they were, in reality, simply four alternative theories to recover amounts 
allegedly owed for the same work started by Iron Head but not completed on the 
Gurneys' residence. (R. 1-8.) 
13. The Gurneys disputed each of Iron Head's claims and a trial followed. 
(R. 15-23.) The evidence submitted by Iron Head both before and during trial was 
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inconsistent and contradictory. As described, the sporadic and inconsistent invoices 
were never explained or reconciled, invoice amounts were not supported by the billing 
and payment records Iron Head ultimately provided in discovery, and Mr. Curtis admitted 
on cross-examination at trial that some $16,000 of the amounts Iron Head included 
in its calculations were inappropriate and were not the Gurneys' responsibility. (R. 349-
51; 383.) 
14. On the third day of trial, November 13, 2003, after it became apparent that 
the trial would not finish in the allotted three days and would need to be recommenced in 
the spring, the parties settled all of Iron Head's claims for the sum of $43,500, reserving 
the claim for prejudgment interest. The Gurneys paid the settlement amount in full, as 
agreed.3 (R. 315-316; 332-33.) 
15. Importantly, the case was settled during Iron Head's case in chief, after 
only its principal and banker had testified, and before the Gurneys had an opportunity to 
present their defenses to Iron Head's claims. (R. 316-22; 384; 392-93.) 
16. Subsequently, the parties briefed the prejudgment interest issue for 
decision by the trial court as a matter of law. The Gurneys' position was that Iron Head 
was not entitled to any recovery at all. Even given the payment of a settlement to avoid 
the cost of recommencing the trial at a later date, an award of prejudgment interest was 
not proper because the all of the amounts and dates that were the bases for Iron Head's 
The settlement agreement was read into the record before the trial court and, while 
the settlement agreement was never formally memorialized in a writing executed by the 
parties, its terms were recorded in the trial court's Minutes of Bench Trial. (R. 315-16.) 
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claims were disputed and had never been consistently or accurately stated, even through 
two days of trial. Iron Head's claim for prejudgment interest was not based on any 
billing but rather on the compromise amount agreed to at settlement on November 13, 
2003. That was the only amount recovered by Iron Head, and that amount remained in 
dispute until 3:00 pm that afternoon. It was not a liquidated sum before that time and was 
never susceptible to prior calculation. Moreover, the sum reflects a compromise, not a 
"judgment" upon which an award of interest may be based. (R. 323-36; 362-86.) 
17. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Iron Head prejudgment interest at an 
annual rate of 10% on the compromise sum of $43,500, calculated from December 31, 
2000—a date after which Iron Head's bills were presented but prior to the filing of Iron 
Head's Complaint—to the date of settlement, in total $12,835.48. (R. 387-89; a copy of 
the trial court's Order on Motion for Prejudgment Interest, entered December 16, 2003, is 
attached as Addendum A to this brief; a second Order, entered April 13, 2004, is attached 
as Addendum B to this brief.)4 
18. In awarding prejudgment interest the trial court observed: 
In this case, the amount of damages was disputed until the 
date of settlement, November 12, 2003 [sic]. As of that time, 
the dispute about damages was over and the plaintiffs were 
entitled to recover $43,500.00 from defendants. The 
calculation of interest on that amount is done by formula 
which is based on fixed rules and known standards, namely 
Final judgment on the prejudgment interest issue was entered August 11, 2006 (R. 
440-42.) The trial court's substantive ruling on prejudgment interest appears in the 
December 16, 2003 Order, (R. 387-89), and all references herein to the trial court's ruling 
are to that 2003 Order. 
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the rate of interest and the amount of time passed since the 
claim arose. 
(R. 388.) 
19. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement that the amount allegedly owed to 
Iron Head was disputed until the date of settlement, the trial court concluded that the 
$43,500 settlement amount was fixed as of an earlier "particular date"—December 31, 
2000—which was prior to the date Iron Head filed its Complaint. Specifically, the trial 
court stated: 
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. 
Both sides offered testimony in this case that there was a 
meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney that 
occurred in the Gurney home in early December 2000. This 
is the meeting where Richard testified that he had an invoice 
or printed statement or bill with him, offered to show it to 
Alan, but Alan refused to look at it. It is clear from this 
evidence that no work was done on that project after that date. 
December 31, 2000 is an appropriate date to use to calculate 
the passage of time. The time elapsed between December 31, 
2000 and November 12, 2003 is 3 years minus 18 days, or, 3 
times 365 minus 18, or 1,077 days. 
(R.387-88) (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are at least three reasons the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment 
interest to Iron Head on the compromise amount of $43,500, calculated from 
December 31, 2000 through the date of settlement. 
First, prejudgment interest may not be based on the compromise sum the Gurneys 
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paid to settle the lawsuit with Iron Head. "As established nearly a century ago . . . Utah 
courts award prejudgment interest in cases where damages are complete and can be 
measured by fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." Smith v. Fairfax 
Realty, Inc. 2003 UT 41,117, 82 P.3d 1064 (quotations and citation omitted). In the 
present case, there were no damages proven and no judgment entered against the 
Gurneys. There was no admission nor finding of liability against the Gurneys. Instead 
the parties settled the case early in the trial for $43,500—a sum far lower than Iron Head 
originally sought. This amount represents a compromise and is the product of the settling 
parties' discretion. It was not based on "fixed rules of evidence or known standards of 
value." Id. Moreover, the $43,500 sum did not become fixed until it was agreed to by 
the parties on the November 13, 2003 date of settlement. Thus, it could not have been 
fixed as of December 31, 2000, as the trial court ruled. Finally, permitting prejudgment 
interest on the compromise amount would be contrary to Utah's policy favoring 
settlement of disputes because it would penalize stipulating parties by exposing them to 
the risk of prejudgment interest. 
Second, prejudgment interest is not allowed in actions seeking equitable relief 
such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit because of the lack of mathematical 
certainty inherent in these types of claims. See Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah 
County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In the present case, the parties' 
settlement agreement resolved Iron Head's equitable claims for unjust enrichment and 
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quantum meruit. Nothing in the settlement provides that it was intended to resolve only 
the contract claims. Accordingly, the award of prejudgment interest on the $43,500 
amount paid to settle the equitable claims. 
Finally, the amount claimed by and allegedly owed to Iron Head was a moving 
target both before and throughout trial and, thus, was never liquidated or susceptible to 
calculation within a mathematical certainty, as required for an award of prejudgment 
interest. See id. Iron Head's billings, lien, pleadings, records, and other evidence were 
conflicting and inconsistent. They were all disputed. Mr. Curtis himself admitted that 
some amounts were erroneously included in the billings. Indeed, even assuming Iron 
Head were entitled to recover some amount from the Gurneys, it would have been 
impossible to calculate the actual amount of money due without completing the trial. 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest on 
the $43,500 settlement amount was incorrect and must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY ONLY BE AWARDED ON 
DAMAGES THAT ARE FIXED AT A PARTICULAR TIME AND 
CALCULABLE WITH MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY. 
Prejudgment interest is not appropriate in all instances. Rather, "'[prejudgment 
interest is properly awarded when the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by 
facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. [A] court may 
only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a mathematical 
certainty."5 Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, \ 43, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Orlob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt, 2005 UT App 430,135, 124 P.3d 
269). "On the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage must be ascertained and 
assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not 
allowed." Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, % 64, 71 P.3d 188 (quotations 
and citation omitted). As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be 
allowed before judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, 
not whether the damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but 
whether the injury and consequent damages are complete and 
must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, 
which the court or jury must follow in fixing the amount 
rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing 
the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, 
1 
or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed 
standards of value. 
Smith v. Fairfax Realty», Inc., 2003 UT 41,120, 82 P.3d 1064 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907)). Thus, if the amount 
of damages or loss is subject to "broad discretion," prejudgment interest is inappropriate. 
See id. 
Applying these principles, Iron Head is not entitled to prejudgment interest on the 
compromise sum of $43,500 from the date of December 31, 2000 because (1) this amount 
results from a November 13, 2003 settlement agreement between Iron Head and the 
Gurneys rather than from a determination of liability and a calculated award of damages 
by the trier of fact; (2) the compromised sum was paid by the Gurneys after three days of 
trial—after it became apparent that the trial could not be completed within the allotted 
time—in order to settle Iron Head's claims, including both legal and equitable claims; 
and (3) the additional amount claimed by Iron Head, both before and during trial, was 
inconsistent and speculative and, thus, not calculable by a mathematical certainty. 
A. Iron Head is not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on a Compromised 
Sum Resulting from a Settlement Agreement. 
The trial court erred in awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest on the $43,500 
compromise sum, calculated back to before the filing of the Complaint, because the 
amount paid is wholly based on the parties' stipulation and agreement to settle all claims. 
As indicated, the principal dispute in the underlying case was whether Iron Head was 
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entitled to any payment in addition to the parties' contract price for work performed on 
the Gurneys' residence. In January 2001, Iron Head filed suit alleging four separate 
causes of action to attempt to recover this money, yet both before and during trial was not 
able to substantiate or establish with any degree of certainty the amount of money it 
claimed was owed. Each billing and claim set out a different amount. On the third day 
of trial, after it became apparent the trial would have to be interrupted for months, the 
parties agreed to settle all of Iron Head's claims, with the exception of the issue of 
prejudgment interest, for $43,500. The settlement occurred before Iron Head was 
finished presenting its case in chief and, thus, before the evidence was complete or could 
be weighed by the Court. There was never a finding of fact on an amount due and no 
judgment was entered against the Gurneys. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Iron 
Head prejudgment interest on the compromise sum calculated back to a date before Iron 
Head even filed its Complaint. 
While no Utah court has directly addressed this issue, there are at least four 
reasons why prejudgment interest should not have been awarded on the settlement 
amount agreed to by the parties. 
1. No damages were awarded. 
Prejudgment interest requires "the injury and consequent damages" to be 
"complete" and "ascertained as of a particular time." Smith, 2003 UT 41 at f 20 
(emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). Here, no damages were ever 
3 
awarded. Iron Head did not prevail on its underlying claims and never established its 
entitlement to a specific amount of damages. Indeed, the parties settled the case for far 
less than the amount Iron Head prayed for in its Complaint.5 
2. There was no determination of loss, injury, or liability and the 
Court randomly chose the date from which interest was to run. 
There was no determination that there was even an injury or loss incurred by Iron 
Head, much less one fixed as of December 31, 2000. Although the settlement called for 
the Gurneys to pay Iron Head $43,500, Ihe Gurneys disclaimed any obligation at all to 
Iron Head beyond the fixed sum set forth in its contract. They made no admission of 
liability. Neither can liability be inferred by the mere fact that the Gumeys agreed to pay 
money to end the dispute. This settlement represented a compromise by both parties and 
confirmed only that neither side wished to continue to litigate the matter. 
Moreover, even if there had been an established loss or injury to Iron Head, which 
there was not, the trial court seemingly picked the date from which interest was to run— 
December 31, 2000—at random. This is error. The loss must be fixed as of "a particular 
time." Id. Specifically, the trial court held: 
Both sides offered testimony in this case that there was a 
meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney that 
occurred in the Gumey home in early December 2000. This 
is the meeting where Richard testified that he had an invoice 
or printed statement or bill with him, offered to show it to 
Alan, but Alan refused to look at it. It is clear from this 
5
 As indicated, in its complaint, Iron Head sought $71,000 plus profit and interest 
and had filed a mechanic's lien on the property in the inconsistent amount of $119,051. 
(R. 1-8.) 
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evidence that no work was done on that project after that date. 
December 31, 2000 is an appropriate date to use to calculate 
the passage of time. 
(R. 388) (emphasis added). The date of the alleged meeting was not the date the last 
work was completed. It was not the date of the last bill furnished to the Gurneys. Rather 
than rely on a fixed date as required, the trial court seems to have used discretion—after 
hearing part of only one party's evidence—in choosing December 31, 2000. This alone 
confirms that the award of interest was an exercise of discretion. This is error because an 
award of prejudgment interest requires an absence of discretion. See, e.g., id. (observing 
that Utah courts "deny prejudgment interest where amounts are to be determined by the 
broad discretion of the jury").6 
3. The compromise sum of $43,500 was the product of the parties' 
discretion. 
An amount arrived at by settlement is, by nature, a product of negotiation between 
the parties and, therefore, subject to the discretion of the parties. It is fundamental that "a 
court may only award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a 
mathematical certainty." Bennett, 2007 UT App 19 at f 43 (quotations and citation 
6
 The trial court's holding suggests a finding that the Gurneys owed Iron Head 
$43,500 as of the December 2000 meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney. 
That was not the case. The trial court's reliance on the December meeting is in itself 
questionable, given that the trial court did not hear the Gurneys' evidence regarding the 
nature, dates, and extent of the incomplete work that had been done on their house or 
describing what occurred at the December meeting. Because the case was settled, the 
trial court was not called upon to, and was not entitled to, make findings or otherwise 
resolve this dispute through judgment. Additionally, Iron Head never claimed or 
attempted to prove that it was owed $43,500. 
5 
omitted). The amount of damages must be measurable by "facts and figures," Cornia v. 
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995), and in "accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value." Smith, 2003 UT 41 at f 23. 
The parties' settlement agreement does not meet this test. The $43,500 settlement 
amount reflected a compromise and was not traceable to any amount allegedly owed or 
claimed to be owed by the Gurneys to Iron Head. Simply put, there was no invoice, 
receipt, contract, allegation, or any other fact or evidence upon which the $43,500 
amount was based. To the contrary, the settlement amount was purely a mutually 
inconvenient figure negotiated to settle the case. It was not "owed" or liquidated prior to 
the date the settlement agreement was entered into.7 Therefore, it is a discretionary 
amount upon which no prejudgment interest may attach. 
4. Awarding prejudgment interest on a settlement amount is 
contrary to Utah's public policy favoring settlement. 
An award of prejudgment interest on the parties' settlement agreement, 
calculated back to before Iron Head's cause of action arose, is contrary to Utah's public 
policy of encouraging settlement. See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989). 
("The public policy is to encourage settlements.") 
7
 Cf. Carlson Distr. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App 227, ff 32-
34, 95 P.3d 1171 (refusing to base an award of prejudgment interest on an amount 
admitted or stipulated to in the party's answer and counterclaim, but instead requiring the 
interest to be based on the amount of damages actually awarded by the jury, because 
"prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the 
amount owed," and the jury award is the "amount owed" (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
6 
For example, in Pearson Construction Co. v. Intertherm Incorporated, 566 P.2d 
575, 576 (Wash Ct. App. 1977), the plaintiff filed suit to recover for property damage 
resulting from a fire caused by a defective heater manufactured by the defendant. The 
fire occurred 18 months before the plaintiff filed his complaint, seeking $50,000 in 
property damage and "loss of profits and business reputation in an equal amount." Id. at 
577. On the first day of trial, counsel for the defendant stipulated that damages were 
$51,000. The plaintiff contended that "because of the stipulation and because [the 
defendant] did not contest the claim other than a general denial," the amount claimed was 
liquidated, and he was therefore entitled to prejudgment interest "from the date of the 
fire." Id. The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed, holding: 
A stipulation as to damages at trial does not relate back and 
fix the amount as of the time the cause of action arose, and, 
indeed, it should not. Stipulations are viewed by courts with 
favor, and adoption of the rule advanced by the [plaintiff] 
would penalize stipulating parties by exposing them to the 
risk of prejudgment interest. 
o 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, allowing prejudgment interest as awarded in the present case, from 
December 31, 2000 to the date of settlement, would have the effect of discouraging 
settlement. Iron Head asserted both legal and equitable causes of action against the 
o 
The Pearson decision accords with the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Carlson 
Distribution Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.Ct 2004 UT App 227, fflf 32-34, 95 P.3d 
1171, in that both decisions rejected the idea that prejudgment interest can be based on a 
stipulated amount. 
7 
Gurneys. As discussed above (and further below), prejudgment interest is not allowed on 
claims in which damages are discretionary, such as equitable claims. See generally 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991); Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 
UT App 201, f 64, 71 P.3d 188. If, as the trial court ruled, prejudgment interest is 
permitted on an amount stemming from a settlement agreement, there is no advantage to 
settling any discretionary damage claims, as this would then open all claims up for the 
attachment of prejudgment interest. This would create a bad policy and should be 
rejected by this Court.9 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision awarding Iron 
Head prejudgment interest on the compromised sum from December 31, 2000 until the 
date of settlement must be reversed. 
B. Iron Head is not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest for its Equitable 
Claims. 
The trial court also erred by awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest on its 
equitable claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. It is well established that 
prejudgment interest is not typically allowed in actions seeking equitable relief such as 
unjust enrichment or quantum meruit because of the lack of mathematical certainty 
inherent in these types of claims. See, e.g., Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d at 1097; Shoreline 
9
 In fact, it appears that courts which have awarded prejudgment interest on a 
settlement agreement have only done so commencing/rom the date the settlement 
became final, and then only in a subsequent action between one of the parties to the 
settlement agreement and that party's insurance company or indemnitee. See, e.g., 
Nuestrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir. 1998). 
8 
Development, Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In 
Shoreline, in particular, this Court refused to award prejudgment interest on an unjust 
enrichment claim, observing: 
A survey of our cases where prejudgment interest was 
awarded indicates that interest has been allowed in actions for 
damage to personal property, in actions brought on a written 
contract, and in an action to recover a liquidated overpayment 
of water subscription charges. In many of these cases, we 
stressed that the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and 
the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of 
damages. No case has been cited to us where we have 
allowed prejudgment interest in an action such as the 
instant case, which is for equitable relief. "A suit of this 
nature ••• invokes consideration of the principles of equity 
which address themselves to the conscience and discretion of 
the trial court." In view of the highly equitable nature of this 
action where the court has discretion in determining the 
amount, if any, to be [awarded to the plaintiff], we find no 
error in the denial of prejudgment interest. 
Shoreline, 835 P.2d at 211 (emphasis added) (citing Bellon, 808 P.2d at 1097); see also 
James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 671 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(stating "Utah courts have upheld the denial of prejudgment interest in action seeking . . . 
unjust enrichment"); Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (concluding "even if quantum meruit is awarded on remand, no prejudgment 
interest should be awarded"); Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, 
124, 993 P.2d 222 (upholding the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest since one of 
the five causes of action the plaintiff submitted to the jury was an unjust enrichment 
9i 
claim). Notably, several of these cases sought recovery of excess construction costs. 
The trial court erred in awarding Iron Head prejudgment interest on the $43,500 
arrived at via settlement. As indicated, Iron Head filed suit alleging four causes of 
action: (1) breach of contract; (2) recovery in quantum meruit, (3) unjust enrichment; 
and (4) to foreclose on a mechanic's lien. (R. 1-8.) These were alternative claims, and 
Iron Head did not elect a remedy prior to settling the case. The settlement agreement 
resolved all of Iron Head's claims. Accordingly, by awarding Iron Head prejudgment 
interest on the $43,500 compromise sum, the trial court improperly awarded Iron Head 
prejudgment interest, at last in part, on its claims for equitable relief. 
C. The Amount was Unliquidated Until Settlement. 
Finally, even assuming arguendo that prejudgment interest may be appropriately 
awarded on a compromise that resolved, in part, equitable claims, Iron Head was still not 
entitled to prejudgment interest because it was never able to establish that its alleged 
damages were calculable to a "mathematical certainty," as required for an award of 
10
 Before the trial court, in its Brief in Support of Claim for Prejudgment Interest, 
Iron Head claimed that Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) supports an 
award of prejudgment interest in this case. It does not. Although Davies does appear to 
have allowed prejudgment interest on a recovery based on quantum meruit, later 
decisions have unanimously rejected application of prejudgment interest to equitable 
claims such as unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, as described above. Moreover, 
Davies is entirely distinguishable from the present case. In Davies, the court awarded 
prejudgment interest after rendering judgment following a trial, see id. at 265-66, 
whereas the present case was resolved by settlement. As indicated by the Davies court, 
"[i]n awarding damages, the applicable legal rate of interest must also be determined." 
Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Here, there was no judgment entered and, thus, no damages 
were awarded and no finding was made as to the date any alleged benefit was conferred 
or that the Gurneys allegedly acknowledged receipt of that benefit. 
10 
prejudgment interest. Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ^  43, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
The inherent uncertainty in Iron Head's alleged damages is first established by a 
review of the pleadings. For example, Iron Head claimed a different amount in the Notice 
of Lien ($119,051.07) than it sought in its complaint ($71,000 plus profit and interest).11 
(R. 1-8.) The uncertainty is further established by the fact that in its first cause of action 
for breach of contract, Iron Head asked the Court to award its "total cost" of its work, less 
1 9 
the amounts paid by the Gurneys, plus profit in an amount to be established. Leaving 
alone the fact that profit could not be calculated without a trial, the nature of the "total 
cost" claim itself confirms that the claim was never for a liquidated amount. 
The leading Utah case on the disfavored "total cost" theory is Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific, et al, 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). There, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that damages must ordinarily be traced to specific wrongs and that 
extra construction work is, at the time it is performed, "highly susceptible to precise 
determination . . . if change orders had been issued, material invoices segregated, and 
1 ]
 As indicated above, Iron Head never attempted to substantiate the $119,000 lien 
amount. The different amount claimed in the lien, as compared to its invoices and 
complaint, confirms that even Iron Head could not calculate what it believed was due. 
While it initially asserted claims based on contract, Iron Head later argued that the 
contract was never followed and sought recovery instead in equity under principles of 
quantum meruit without offering (by designated document or witness) any opinion on the 
value of the improvements it installed. 
11 
man-hours separately recorded." Id., at 1047.13 Barring the ability to so document 
claims, the "total cost" theory may be used only if four predicate factors are established, 
one of which is that the <(nature of the particular losses make[sic] it impossible or highly 
impractical to determine them with a reasonable degree of accuracy. " Id. (Emphasis 
added.) Iron Head's theory thus creates for it an unsolvable dilemma: prejudgment 
interest is only available if damages can be calculated with reasonable accuracy as of the 
time of the loss, but its "total cost" claim was necessarily based in the premise that such 
losses were "impossible or highly impractical" to determine. 
The uncertainty of the amount allegedly owed to Iron Head is further established 
by the conflicting and inconsistent evidence Iron Head submitted both before and during 
trial. Indeed, it would have been impossible to determine the actual amount of money 
owed to Iron Head (if any) without completing the trial. Specifically: 
• Iron Head's invoices were sporadic, inconsistent and did not reconcile with its 
own records. As indicated by the Affidavit of Patrick J. Kilbourne, CPA, CMA, 
for example: 
The first payment was made by the Gurneys in the amount of 
$43,028, apparently without receiving a formal bill. Iron 
Head deposited the check on March 23, 2000. (Exhibit 84.) 
About a month later, Iron Head presented its first invoice, 
No. 127, dated April 26, 2000 in the amount of $49,871. 
(Exhibit 115.) The Gurneys paid the sum of $51,476 
approximately one week later. (Exhibit 84.) The next billing, 
No. 149, in the amount of $41,951.58 was dated June 28, 
Here, Iron Head's failure to keep and present contemporaneous documentation of 
the alleged extra work was the primary reason a trial was required. 
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2000. (Exhibit 116.) It was paid approximately one week 
later. (Exhibit 84.) 
The next Iron Head invoice, No. 156, in the amount of 
$92,261.62 was presented to the Gurneys on or about 
August 2, 2000. (Exhibit 86.) A payment on this bill was 
made in the amount of $25,000 and deposited by Iron Head 
on August 7, 2000. (Exhibit 84.) This invoice, prepared after 
all substantial work had been completed, was the last invoice 
presented by Iron Head to the Gurneys. A subsequent 
invoice, No. 174, dated November 22, 2000 in the amount of 
$82,463.33 was prepared by Iron Head. (Exhibit 87.) I am 
informed, however, that this invoice was never actually 
presented or delivered to the Gumeys except in connection 
with the discovery in this lawsuit. 
(R. 350-51.) Nonetheless, as indicated above, none of these amounts squared with 
the amounts Iron Head claimed in its Notice of Lien or in its Complaint. 
• Mr. Kilbourne also observed an internal inconsistency in the August 2000 invoice 
for $92,261.62: 
For example, the amounts billed in invoice No. 156 (Exhibit 
86), which was prepared after the last of the Anderson 
Lumber invoices, and those in invoice No. 174 (Exhibit 87) 
differ. Based on my review of Iron Head's records, I 
calculate the amount actually paid to Anderson Lumber on 
this account by Iron Head was $30,662. 
(R. 350.) 
• Mr. Curtis, on behalf of Iron Head, further acknowledged that the inconsistencies 
in Iron Head's billing: 
In addition, I understand that Mr. Curtis acknowledged in his 
trial testimony that approximately $16,000 of the amounts 
included in its invoices should not have been passed on to the 
Gurneys, including Anderson Lumber pre-August interest 
payments, a Skill saw and nail gun purchased from Ace 
Hardware, an American Olean payment that was included in 
» 
the Johansen invoice, a Designer Marble invoice for a spec 
house, and amounts paid to Homestyle General and Mike Lot 
for painting that was done by others. These errors persisted 
through Iron Head's invoices and were not corrected by the 
Notice of Lien or the Complaint. 
(R. 350.) 
• Iron Head's billings were submitted without underlying ledgers and invoices. As 
indicated by Mr. Kilbourne: 
It is impossible to tell from the information presented by Iron 
Head to the Gurneys what items were included in the total or 
how prior payments had been credited. Invoice 127 (Exhibit 
115), for example, included the sum of $5,000 for 
"HEATING ROUGH" and was paid in full. However, this 
money was never paid to Sevier Heating, the heating 
contractor (Exhibit 34). 
(R. 350.) 
In sum, at no time prior to settlement, in its billings to the Gurneys, its notice of 
lien or in its pleadings or evidence prepared and submitted in connection with the 
litigation, was Iron Head ever able to establish any alleged amount of damages 
consistently or "within a mathematical certainty." As such, it is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest as awarded in this case—from December 31, 2000 until November 
13, 2003 (the date of settlement). 
14 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision awarding prejudgment interest 
on a compromise sum paid by the Gurneys pursuant to a settlement agreement was 
erroneous and must be reversed. 
Dated this 2nd day of March 2007. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
AARON D. LEBENTA 
LLOYD D. RICKENBACH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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DISTRICT COURT, Sevier County, UTAH 
895 E. 300 N. 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 435-896-2700 Fax: 435-896-8047 
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC.,, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN K. GURNEY and VICKIW. 
GURNEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-
JUDGMENT INTEREST 
Case No. 010600008 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
This case represents a disputed claim for money to complete a residential construction 
and remodeling project. Plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to money. Defendants said that 
they had paid some money, but the invoices and records were incomplete and inconsistent. 
The dispute about money ended on the third day of trial when the parties settled their all 
but one of their differences. The settlement was that the defendants agreed to pay a sum of 
money to the Plaintiff. The parties presented their agreement to me in court and I approved it. 
No more evidence was presented. The issue of pre-judgment interest was reserved for decision 
by me. 
The topic of pre-judgment interest was recently treated by the Utah Supreme Court in its 
opinion in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, Utah Supreme Court October 3,2003 at 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, Case number 010600008, Page -2-
Paragraph 16 and following paragraphs. The principles announced in the Smith v. Fairfax case 
seem to be applicable to the situation here. 
The general rule is that pre-judgment interest is awarded in cases where "damages are 
complete" and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." 
Smith v. Fairfax at Paragraph 17. 
In this case, the amount of damages was disputed until the date of the settlement, 
November 12,2003. As of that time, the dispute about damages was over and the plaintiffs were 
entitled to recover $43,500.00 from the defendants. The calculation of interest on that amount is 
done by a formula which is based on fixed rules and known standards, namely the rate of interest 
and the amount of time passed since the claim arose. 
The interest rate to be used in the calculation is 10% per year, the so called "legal rate" as 
established by law, Section 15-1-1, Utah Code. 
The passage of time is measured from a particular event. Both sides offered testimony in 
this case that there was a meeting between Richard Curtis and Alan Gurney that occurred in the 
Gurney home in early December of 2000. This is the meeting where Richard testified that he had 
an invoice or a printed statement or bill with him, offered to show it to Alan, but Alan refused to 
look at it. It is clear from this evidence that no work was done on that project after that date. 
December 31, 2000 is an appropriate date to use to calculate the passage of time. The time 
elapsed between December 31,2000 and November 12,2003 is 3 years minus 18 days, or, 3 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST, Case number 010600008, Page -3-
times 365 minus 18, or 1,077 days. 
Hence the formula for calculating interest becomes: $43,500.00 times 10% per year times 
1,077/365. Applying the mathematical principles to the formula yields the result of $12,835.48. 
It appears to me that pre-judgment interest is allowable under the circumstances presented here. 
Hence, Mr. Bagley is directed to prepare an appropriate order and submit it to the court for 
execution in such a way that Mr. Barnes has a way to see it and object to it before it is presented 
to me for signing. 
Date / ^ 1 C 2003 LXHiJU. 
"v V.''TEc,' 
e'fjl* *•*«.,, ' " 
o: 
David L . M o w e r f t" "?-'~ > ~ \ ,\ ^ 
District Court Judge ** i. \ \ C - '-—v ^ 
Certificate of Notification 
on h>kA, n ___, 2003, a copy of the above was sent to: 
Name 
Marvin D. Bagley 
Attorney at Law 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Address 
By Hand 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 S. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2216 | 
X UAKOU ^'VWifr 
ADDENDUM B 
Edwin C. Barnes (Bar No. 0217) 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. (Bar No. 7975) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801)322-2516 
Facsimile: (801) 521-6280 
c[yj.'-= r-K- --><-.- ~*,inr 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRON HEAD CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ALAN K. GURNEY and 
VICKI W. GURNEY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 010600008 
Judge David L. Mower 
Trial commenced in this case on November 10, 2003 before the Honorable 
David L. Mower. Plaintiff Iron Head Construction, Inc. was represented by its counsel 
of record, Marvin D. Bagley, and two of its representatives, Richard Curtis and Amber 
Curtis, were present during the proceedings. Defendants Alan K. Gurney and Vicki W. 
Gurney appeared in person and were represented by their counsel of record, Edwin C. 
Barnes. 
On the third day of trial, November 13, 2003, Iron Head's first witness was still 
testifying and it was apparent to all that the trial could not be completed within the time 
allotted. At that time, without completing Iron Head's case and without presentation of 
any evidence by the Gurneys, the parties agreed on terms to compromise all of Iron 
Head's claims, with the exception of its claim for prejudgment interest. The parties 
orally presented their settlement agreement to the Court. In their oral presentation, the 
parties agreed to submit the issue of entitlement to prejudgment interest to the Court for 
decision by simultaneous written arguments and submissions. The parties did so and, 
on or about December 16, 2003, the Court issued its Order On Motion for Prejudgment 
Interest, awarding $12,835.48 to Iron Head based upon application of mathematical ~ y ^ 
principles to the agreed settlement amoun£ ^ ^ {&&<>** > 
The parties represent in filing this Order that the agreed settlement amount was 
timely paid. Iron Head's claims, having been thus resolved, are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with the exception of the prejudgment interest claim. 
The prejudgment interest payment, in accordance with the Court's ruling and the 
schedule agreed to by the parties, will be due on or before April 14, 2004. Should the 
Gurneys make timely payment of the prejudgment interest amount, the Gurneys may 
submit a form of final Judgment pursuant to which all claims between Iron Head and the 
Gurneys will be completely released and discharged. In the event the Gurneys do not 
pay the prejudgment interest amount on or before April 14, 2004, Iron Head may submit 
a form of final Judgment ordering payment in the amount of $12,835.48 on the basis of 
the Court's December 15, 2003 Order. Iron Head may also, by motion and affidavit(s), 
present the issue of the validity of Iron Head's claimed lien to the Court for a 
determination as to whether the lien is security for that obligation. 
Dated this 0 of April 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
; c / ^ -.vid L. Mov/cr 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CGLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DAVID L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
